Abstract. When a conflict of duties arises, a resolution is often sought by use of an ordering of priority or importance. This paper examines how such a conflict resolution works, compares mechanisms that have been proposed in the literature, and gives preference to one developed by Brewka and Nebel. I distinguish between two cases -that some conflicts may remain unresolved, and that a priority ordering can be determined that resolves all -and provide semantics and axiomatic systems for accordingly defined dyadic deontic operators.
Introduction
W. D. Ross (1930) argued that whenever there appears to be a conflict of duties, through careful study of all aspects of the situation one will arrive at the conclusion -or rather: the considered opinion -that one of these duties is ''more pressing'' than others, and this duty is then one's duty sans phrase, whereas the others were prima facie only. Ross gives the following example:
EXAMPLE (The road accident). ''If I have promised to meet a friend at a particular time for some trivial purpose, I should certainly think myself justified in breaking my engagement if by doing so I could prevent a serious accident or bring relief to the victims of one.'' There are two conflicting obligations: to keep the promise, and to prevent the accident or help its victims. The second takes priority: it is in these circumstances ''more of a duty'' than keeping the appointment.
While in the example the determination of the priority ordering seems to rely on a comparison of the outcomes of satisfying or violating the conflicting duties under considerations of utility and possible harm, in the case of legal obligations or individual imperatives the ordering can often be directly obtained from the norm's position in a normative hierarchy or the rank of the issuing authority. These factors may also relate to each other, e.g. when the decision of a commander in the field overrules that of her superior due to some unforeseen danger or opportunity. I will leave aside the question of how a particular ordering is determined, and also not address Ross's notoriously problematic distinction between a prima facie duty and a duty sans phrase. What interests me here is rather how a conflict resolution based on (established) priorities works, i.e. what the resolution mechanism looks like, or should look like, when an ordering of priority or importance of possibly conflicting norms is assumed. Section 2 introduces the formal framework and explains how it is used to define deontic operators. After pointing out counterintuitive results of a conflict resolution based on a method by Horty (2003) , I show in Section 3 that a method developed for the resolution of inconsistencies in prioritized theory bases by Brewka ( , 1991 and Nebel (1991 Nebel ( , 1992 fares better (Section 3). A broader comparison includes ordering based mechanisms by Alchourro´n and Makinson (1981) , Ga¨rdenfors (1984) , Alchourro´n (1986) , and variants (Section 4). Section 5 explores what a priority ordering must be like to resolve all possible conflicts, and provides a sound and weakly complete axiomatic system (which readers might find familiar) for a corresponding dyadic deontic operator. All formal proofs are delegated to the Appendix. Section 6 concludes.
Imperative semantics and deontic logic
When a conflict between norms is resolved by an appeal to some priority ordering, I assume that what is thus conceived as ordered are the norms themselves, though their ordering may reflect a ranking of their sources, or an axiological order of the states realized when fulfilling the norms. So for a logical analysis, some formal representation of norms is required. I only consider unconditional imperatives, 1 like ''Invite Jones to dinner!'', and I is a set of such imperatives. To each imperative corresponds a descriptive sentence like ''You invite Jones to dinner,'' which -grammatically similar, but in the indicative, not the imperative mood -describes what must be the case if and only if (iff) the imperative is satisfied. Any such descriptive sentence is assumed to have a formalization in the language of a basic logic, which I let be propositional logic PL.
2 A function f : I ! L PL assigns every imperative in I the L PL -formalization of its corresponding descriptive sentence, and the tuple hI; f i is called a basic imperative structure. I write !A for an i in I with f (i)=A, and use the superscripted i f ; C f instead of fðiÞ; f ðCÞ for better readability. In analogue to the usual concept of remainders, let IfA be the maximal sets of imperatives such that the sets of corresponding descriptive sentences do not derive A (I also call these ''A-remainders'' of I), i.e. IfA contains all C I such that (i) C f 0 PL A and (ii) there is no D I : C & D and D f 0 PL A. In the 'imperativist tradition' of deontic logic, authors used such semantics to interpret deontic formulas, rather than employing the usual possible worlds semantics.
3 Let deontic formulas be those of a language L DL , based on an alphabet like the one for L PL , except that it additionally contains the operator symbol 'O', whereby OA formalizes the (true or false) statement that what A describes is obligatory. L DL is then the smallest set such that (a) for all A 2 L PL ; OA 2 L DL , (b) if A; B 2 L DL , so are :A; ðA^BÞ; ðA _ BÞ; ðA ! BÞ; ðA $ BÞ.
Interpretations of Boolean operators being as usual, the truth definition
ðtd-1Þ hI; f i OA iff I f ' PL A:
defines a normal modal logic, i.e. the set of L DL -sentences defined as true for all tuples hI; f i equals the axiomatically defined set that contains all L DLinstances into tautologies, furthermore all L PL -instances into ðExtÞ If ' PL A $ B; then OA $ OB is in the set:
ðMÞ OðA^BÞ ! ðOA^OBÞ ðCÞ ðOA^OBÞ ! OðA^BÞ ðNÞ O> and is closed under modus ponens. Furthermore, the above truth definition defines standard deontic logic SDL, which adds the ''deontic'' scheme (D):
ðDÞ OA ! PA iff hI; fi is required to be such that I f is consistent (as usual, PA abbreviates :O:A). Requiring I f to be consistent excludes conflicts between imperatives and is thus a severe and in this case unwanted restriction, for to show how conflicts are resolved they must first be semantically modeled. But if e.g. two imperatives !p 1 and !( p 2^: p 1 ) can both be in I, then not only does (D) fail, but also (td-1) is not very useful, making OA true for any A 2 L PL . Instead, the following definition for a ''disjunctive'' ought operator was put forward: will not suffice if subjects can get (themselves) into dilemmas, i.e. situations where the norms are collectively satisfiable at the outset, but due to misfortune or failure they cannot all be satisfied anymore. To handle such situations, and to e.g. prevent the derivation of O(^/p 1 ) when I contains !ð:p 1 _ p 2 Þ and !ð:p 2^p3 Þ , the truth definition for a ''disjunctive'' dyadic ought operator can be given as:
So A is obligatory in the situation described by C if A is what the imperatives in any :C-remainder demand, given C. With usual truth conditions for Boolean operators, this semantics has a sound and (weakly) complete axiom system PD defined as containing all L DDL -instances into tautologies, all L PL -instances into 5 PD resembles the system P defined by Kraus et al. (1990) with the (restricted) dyadic ''deontic'' scheme (DD-R) added, hence the name.
For the present purposes, I define a prioritized imperative structure to be a tuple hI; f; <i that is like a basic imperative structure, except that it additionally includes an ordering relation < on I, where the formal properties of this relation are for the moment left open. Unfortunately, authors disagree on the direction in which 'i 1 < i 2 ' is to be read, if it means that i 1 takes priority over i 2 (reading < like a preference relation), or that i 1 is less important than i 2 (reading < like a utility function). I assume the former, and adapt differing definitions to this convention, so e.g. a tuple i 1 < i 2 < i 3 . . . is read like a list that starts with what is most important. For any ordering < on some set C; I define min < C ¼ fi 2 C j 8i 0 2 C : if i 0 6 ¼ i, then i 0 hig, so min < I is the set of the highest ranking, most important, etc. imperatives, and max < C ¼ fi 2 C j 8i 0 2 C : if i 0 6 ¼ i, then ihi 0 g, so max < I are the imperatives that come last, are least important, rank lowest, etc.
Reasoning with prioritized imperatives
As explained by Ross, in the case of a normative conflict one proceeds by examining the situation for clues to an ordering of the obligations involved, e.g. by considering the rank of the issuing authority, notions of urgency or a gross difference in the utilities of the outcomes. The example of the road accident illustrates that the disjunctive ought operator defined in the previous section, which pays no attention to priorities, produces inadequate results: EXAMPLE (The road accident: disjunctive reasoning). Let A be helping the accident victims, B keeping the promise, and T a conjunction of actual necessities, including the agent's present physical and psychical capabilities (I write for :T ). An imperative interpretation produces I={!A, !B} and ' PL T ! ðA ! :BÞ as helping causes me to miss the meeting. so (td-1) makes O true and the impossible obligatory, so it is not very useful.
so (td-4) makes O(AÚB/T) true but O(A/T) false, as fB; Tg0 PL A. So there is only a disjunctive obligation to help or proceed to the meeting. But intuitively, helping takes priority over anything else.
The situation looks like a conflict: there exist requirements which cannot all be satisfied. But the conflict is avoided by (so far intuitively) giving priority to the norm of greater weight. Note that if symmetrical or incomparable obligations are not ruled out, then a demand that takes priority can not only dissolve a dilemma, but also create a conflict for an otherwise conflict-free situation: EXAMPLE (The road accident II). It is Tuesday afternoon, and like on all Tuesdays, Mirjam must fetch her grandmother from the day care center before it closes at 6:30. Today, Mirjam was also asked by her boss to bring the office mail to the post office after hours, which also closes at 6:30, but lies in the opposite direction. However, when she told of her other duty, she was allowed to leave early. Driving at 5:30 in the direction of the post office, Mirjam becomes involved in a traffic accident. The law requires her to stay at the accident site until the police have recorded it, which won't happen before 6:00. Then she can only get to one place, the post office or the day care center, on time. The law takes priority over her other duties, but a ranking of these is not obvious; in particular it is difficult to say which violation could have worse consequences, and Mirjam will have a hard time making up her mind.
To formalize the reasoning about priorities when faced with conflicting demands, Horty (2003) proposed that the priority ordering is used to first determine a set of ''binding imperatives'' in the set of all imperatives: DEFINITION 1 (Binding imperatives). Let hI; f; <i be a prioritized imperative structure. Then So an imperative is ''binding'' if there is no higher ranking imperative with a materially inconsistent demand (cf. Horty 2003, p. 560) . If it is also higherranking than any such imperative, Horty calls it ''overriding''. Binding, instead of I, is then used to define a disjunctive dyadic ought operator: Things are as in variant II, but suppose some grave danger arises from Mirjam's not being at the day care center before it closes, as the disturbed old lady will wander off on her own and may fall or get lost. Hence, fetching her is much more urgent than posting the letters, of which the important ones were very likely faxed beforehand. Fetching her grandma may be even more important than waiting for the police, but Mirjam is not sure about that and can do both anyway. So beside !A < !B we have !C < !B, with the ranking between !A and !C unclear. Intuitively, Mirjam must stay until the police are finished and then fetch her grandma. But as it is two higher-ranking imperatives that exclude, if satisfied, the satisfaction of the lower-ranking one, still Binding = {!A, !B, !C}=I, making OðA=TÞ false and even PðB^:C=TÞ true even though !C ranks higher than !B.
EXAMPLE (The road accident IV, with Horty's solution).
Mirjam did not dare ask her boss for permission to leave early, sneaking out at 5:45 instead, but that was too late to get to both places in time, i.e. ' PL T ! ðC ! :BÞ. Again, Mirjam gets involved in a traffic accident and is required to wait for the police. Fetching her grandmother takes priority over posting the mail, so I={!A, !B, !C}, !C < !B and !A < !B. Imagine the accident left her car a wreck, making it impossible to get to the day care center in time, but when the police finish around 6:15 she can still get to the post office. Let S be this situation (including T), so ' PL S ! :C. Binding = {!A, !C}, as !B is not reinstated when satisfying !C is excluded, so Binding f:S ¼ ff!Agg, making Pð:B=SÞ true. But it is hard to see why Mirjam should not have to post the letters.
EXAMPLE (The road accident V, with Horty's solution). As in variant IV, Mirjam left too late to make it to both the post office and the day care center on time, so ' PL T ! ðC ! :BÞ. Again, fetching grandma takes priority over posting the letters, i.e. !C< !B. Suppose it is not the damage, but the time required by the police that makes it impossible to get to the day care center on time (it is too far from the accident site, while the post office is just a block away), so ' PL T ! ðA ! :CÞ. Making up her mind, Mirjam decides that the legal obligation to wait for the police probably takes priority over her familial duty, i.e. !A < !C < !B. Both !B and !C are overridden by higher ranking imperatives and so are not in Binding f:S ¼ ff!Agg, making Pð:B=SÞ true. But again it is hard to see why Mirjam is relieved from posting the letters.
DEONTIC LOGICS FOR PRIORITIZED IMPERATIVES
Thus Horty's set Binding solves simple cases, but is not adequate for complex hierarchies where more than two imperatives may be in conflict, and it makes life too easy when conflicting higher ranking imperatives become unfulfillable or are themselves overridden. 7 To overcome these difficulties when formalizing that disregard for a lower ranking imperative can (only) be excused by obedience to higher-ranking ones (and not vice versa), I suggest that neither remainder sets of I, nor of a fixed subset Binding, but an ''incremental'' maximizing strategy should be used. For a situation C, the relevant sets are constructed by first adding a maximal set of the most important imperatives such that their demands do not derive :C, then adding a maximal subset of the second most important imperatives that can be added without the corresponding demands now deriving :C, etc. Introduced by Rescher (1964, p. 50) , such incremental maximizing was more rigorously defined and employed for the purpose of theory revision by Brewka ( , 1991 and Nebel (1991 Nebel ( , 1992 . Both employ a strict partial order, i.e. < is irreflexive and transitive. Nebel additionally assumes < to be the asymmetric part of a complete preorder £, i.e. obtained from a reflexive, transitive and connected ordering £ via defining i<j iff i £ j and j 6 i. Both agree that < must be well-founded, i.e. infinite descending chains are excluded. 8 For any <, Brewka defines a full prioritization 0 to be any (strict) well-order on the given set that preserves <, i.e. for all i, j: if i< j then i 0 j. Clearly:
THEOREM 1 (Existence of full prioritizations). For every wellfounded strict partial order < on a set C there is a full prioritization 0, i.e. a strict well-order that is order-preserving with respect to <.
Brewka then defines subsets of the set as 'preferred subtheories'. Calling them preferred remainders (they are not theories here), his definition translates thus: 9 DEFINITION 2 (Brewka's preferred remainders). Let hI; f; <i be a prioritized imperative structure, where < is a well-founded strict partial order on I. Then C I belongs to the preferred remainder set I + A iff (i) C f 0 PL A, and (ii) C is obtained from a full prioritization 0 by defining (i) bans the empty set from I + A for tautological A, and (ii) recursively defines S ½0#i to include all elements of some such set for a prior element j, adding i if possible without the corresponding set deriving A. C is the union of all such sets. I drop superscripts if the meaning is clear. The following is almost immediate: THEOREM 2 (Preferred remainders are remainders). Let hI; f; <i be a prioritized imperative structure, where < is a well-founded strict partial order on I. Then I + A IfA.
As noted, Nebel's (1992) approach defines < as the asymmetric part of a complete, well-founded preorder £. For each i 2 I, the priority class [i ]={j 2 I | i £ j and j £ i} contains all j 2 I of the same £-priority as i. A preference-ordering ( N between all subsets D; C of I is then defined by letting
i.e. by preferring D over C iff both agree for all priority classes up to some [i] , of which D contains all elements of C plus more. Then choosing a maximally ( N -preferred set among all C I with C f 0 PL A equals choosing from I + A:
THEOREM 3 (Nebel's prioritized removals). Let hI; f; <i be a prioritized imperative structure, where < is the asymmetric part of a complete, well-founded preorder £ on I. Then I + A equals
There is an alternative, non-constructive definition of Brewka's preferred remainders, attributed to Ryan (1992) by Rintanen (1994) and also appearing in Sakama and Inoue (1996) : Let hI; f; <i be a prioritized imperative structure, where < is a well-founded strict partial order on I, and define p ðIfAÞ to be the set fC 2 IfA j 9 0: 8D 2 IfA n fCg : 9i 2 C n D : 8j 2 D n C : i 0 jg:
So some A-remainder C is in p ðIfAÞ iff for some full prioritization 0; C contains for any other A-remainder D some exclusive element that 0-ranks higher than any element exclusively in D. The following holds.
THEOREM 4 (Preferred remainders, after Ryan and Sakama & Inoue) . Let hI; f; <i be a prioritized imperative structure, < a well-founded strict partial order on I and I + A and pðIfAÞ be as defined. Then I + A ¼ pðIfAÞ.
Proposing use of Brewka's and Nebel's concept of preferred remainders, based on some strict partial, well-founded ordering <, as the resolution mechanism for conflicts between imperatives or dilemmas that arise in certain situations, a disjunctive ought operator can be defined parallel to (td-4) as follows:
ðtd-6Þ I OðA=CÞ iff 8C 2 I + :
This truth definition fares better in dealing with the above examples:
EXAMPLE (The road accident: the Brewka/Nebel solution). A is helping the accident victim, B keeping the promise, I={!A, !B} and ' PL T ! ðA ! :BÞ. The ordering is !A < !B, being its only full prioritization. The construction of S < includes !A but rejects !B, so I + T ={{!A}} and (td-6) makes true OðA=TÞ; Oð:B=TÞ and Pð:B=TÞ, which is as it should be.
EXAMPLE (The road accident II: the Brewka/Nebel solution).
I ¼ f!A; !B; !Cg: ' PL T ! ðA ! :ðB^CÞÞ, as waiting allows Mirjam to get to one place, the post office or the day care center in time, but not both. The ordering is !A < !B and !A < !C, and for !B, !C unclear. Its two full priori-
, so waiting and then going to one place, the post office or the day care center, is obligatory as it should be.
EXAMPLE (The road accident III: the Brewka/Nebel solution).
Still ' PL T ! ðA ! :ðB^CÞÞ, i.e. waiting excludes getting to both places. Fetching her grandma now takes priority over going to the post office, so !C < !B and !A < !B, this time the ranking between !A, !C being unclear. The two full prioritizations are !A 0 !C 0 !B and !C 0 !A 0 !B, so I + T ={{!A, !C}}, and (td-6) makes O(A Ù C/T ) true. So Mirjam must stay at the site until the police are finished with her and then go to fetch her grandmother, as it should be.
EXAMPLE (The road accident IV: the Brewka/Nebel solution).
Getting to both the post office and the day care center on time was never possible, so ' PL T ! ðC ! :BÞ. The car being wrecked, the assumed situation S excludes getting to the day care center on time, so ' PL S ! :C. Again !C < !B and !A < !B, with the relation between !A and !C unclear, so !A 0 !C 0 !B and !C 0 !A 0 !B are the full prioritizations, producing I + :S ¼ ff!A; !Bgg. Hence O(A Ù B/S), i.e. Mirjam must wait and then hurry to the post office, which is as it should be.
EXAMPLE (The road accident V: the Brewka/Nebel solution).
Again, Mirjam cannot get to both the post office and the day care center on time, so ' PL T ! ðC ! :BÞ. Waiting for the police excludes getting to the day care center on time, i.e. ' PL T ! ðA ! :CÞ. Mirjam decides that the law overrides her familial duty, so !A < !C < !B, which, being its only full prioritization, yields I + T ={{!A, !B}}. So Mirjam must wait and post the letters, as it should be.
Let a semantics be called a prioritized imperative semantics iff it defines the truth of L DDL -sentences using (td-6), with respect to arbitrary prioritized imperative structures hI; f; <i. Then it may be surprising -though Rott (1993, Theorem 7) already proved a similar result -that the logical properties of such a semantics are not different from that defining the deontic operator using (td-4), i.e. with respect to basic imperative structures and simple remainders, since the system PD remains sound and (only) weakly complete:
THEOREM 5 (Soundness, completeness of PD). PD is sound and (only) weakly complete with respect to prioritized imperative semantics. Alchourro´n and Makinson (1981) seem to have been the first to logically examine the idea of resolving contradictions in a body of norms, or contradictions that arise from such a body together with some set of true empirical facts, by imposing an order upon that body. The object of their study is a set of regulations that is partially ordered by a relation £, which does not necessarily stand for an ordering by priority or importance. Rather, i £ j means that j is as much exposed, or more exposed, to the risk of legislative derogation as i. If a conflict occurs between two parts of the code, or between the code and some empirical facts, the aim is to find a (possibly maximal) non-conflicting subset that is most secure from the changes which the law-giver will presumably enact upon learning of this situation. Their definition translates to the present framework as follows: DEFINITION 3 (Alchourro´n and Makinson's strict exposure).
Alternative resolution mechanisms

LEAST EXPOSURE AND ITS VARIANTS
Let hI; f; <i be a prioritized imperative structure, where < is a strict partial order on I (like the asymmetric part of a partial order £). Then for all C; D I :
So a subset is strictly less exposed than some other if for any member of the first there is a member of the second which is strictly more exposed. To see how this approach compares to Brewka and Nebel's, consider The exposure criterion yields f!p 1 ; !ðp 2^: p 3 Þg ( AM f!p 1 ; !p 3 g: for each left member, a right member is strictly more exposed, namely !p 3 .
Case 2. Let hI; f; <i be !p 1 < !ð:p 1^p2 Þ < !p 3 , so the ''middle'' now conflicts with the higher-ranking imperative. Then we have
But f!p 1 ; !p 3 g 6 ( AM f!ð:p 1^p2 Þ; !p 3 g: from the left set, !p 3 is not less exposed than !ð:p 1^p2 Þ from the right. The authors recognize that a conflict between higher-ranking norms excludes lower-ranking norms from a least exposed set and propose to use relevant logic for determining conflicts as a cure (Alchourro´n and Makinson 1981, p. 139) .
Case 3. Let hI; f; <i be !p 1 < !ð:p 1^p2^: p 3 Þ < !p 3 , the ''middle'' now in conflict with both ends of the hierarchy (by whatever logic). Then we have -If ?¼ ff!p 1 ; !p 3 g; f!ð:p 1^p2^: p 3 Þgg and -I +?¼ ff!p 1 ; !p 3 gg.
Yet f!ð:p 1^p2^: p 3 Þg ( AM f!p 1 ; !p 3 g: from the right set, !p 3 is more exposed than any left member. Mediocrity rules! But even if !p 3 is more exposed to legislative change, if that change came about and removed !p 3 , the right set would still contain a member that ranks higher than any in the left.
Prakken, pursuing an argumentative approach, wants to employ Alchourro´n and Makinson's criterion at the heart of his ''rebuttal'' mechanism used to determine justified arguments (derivations from facts and defaults. But the criterion he presents (Prakken 1997, p. 192) translates differently: DEFINITION 4 (Prakken's criterion for hierarchical rebuttal).
Let hI; f; <i be a prioritized imperative structure, where < is a strict partial order on I (like the asymmetric part of a partial order £). Then for all C; D I:
So D can be improved by exchanging some member with any member of C. Giving the rationale here and in Prakken and Sartor (1997, p. 36) 10 , the change in the order of the quantifiers seems intentional -yet it makes a difference: let I be f!p 1 ; !p 2 ; !ðp 3^: p 1 Þ; !ðp 4^: p 2 Þg and !p 1 < !ðp 3^: p 1 Þ and !p 2 < !ðp 4^: p 2 Þ. E.g. p 1 , p 2 may be primary targets and p 3^: p 1 ; p 4^: p 2 respective secondary ones, where reaching the secondary target includes failing to reach the (better) primary one. Reaching both primary targets seems best, and in fact f!p 1 ; !p 2 g ( AM f!ðp 3^: p 1 Þ; !ðp 4^: p 2 Þg: for every member in the left set there is a lower-ranking one in the right. Also I + ?¼ ff!p 1 ; p 2 gg, since all four full prioritizations yield this preferred remainder. But f!p 1 ; !p 2 g 6 ( P f!ðp 3^: p 1 Þ; !ðp 4^: p 2 Þg as no member in the right set ranks lower than all in the left. So Prakken's criterion appears even less suited to our task than Alchourro´n & Makinson's. 11 Sartor (1991) used Alchourro´n and Makinson's criterion for a ''prevailing'' relation between subsets modulo a rejected sentence A, 12 as follows:
DEFINITION 5 (Sartor's ''prevailing'' relation). Let hI; f; <i be a prioritized imperative structure, where < is a strict partial order on I, and ( AM be as defined above. Then for all C; D I :
To see how his definition works, consider first the ''mediocrity rules'' example: hI; f; <i is !p 1 <!ð:p 1^p2^: p 3 Þ<!p 3 . Then f!p 1 ; !p 3 g ( ? S f!ð:p 1 p 2^: p 3 Þg, as the only subset of the right set conflicting with the left set is the right set itself, and for this set some conflicting subset of the left set, namely {!p 1 }, is strictly less exposed than the right set. So now the result is as it intuitively should be. Sartor's relation also handles the example against Prakken's criterion well: here I ¼ f!p 1 ; !p 2 ; !ðp 3^: p 1 Þ; !ðp 4^: p 2 Þg, with !p 1 <!ðp 3^: p 1 Þ and !p 2 <!ðp 4^: p 2 Þ. Then f!p 1 ; !p 2 g ( ? S f!ðp 3^: p 1 Þ; !ðp 4^: p 2 Þg, as the three subsets of the right set conflicting with the left set are f!ðp 3^: p 1 Þg; f!ðp 4^: p 2 Þg and the right set itself, with which the following respective subsets of the left set are both in conflict and strictly less exposed: {!p 1 }, {!p 2 }, and the left set itself. So reaching the primary targets is best, as it should be. In fact, it can be proved that preferred remainders are always prevailing remainders, but the converse does not hold: EXAMPLE (Counterexample to prefðIfAÞ I + AÞ. Let hI; f; <i be such that I consists of For (a), consider {i 4 }, which is a subset of the right hand set: it conflicts with the left hand set, so for the relation to hold, a strictly less exposed subset of the left set must also conflict with {i 4 }. The only such subset is the left set itself, but since for its member i 3 there is no strictly more exposed member in {i 4 }, it is not strictly less exposed. The refutation of (b) works similarly using {i 3 }. So Sartor's definition also produces counterintuitive results where Brewka and Nebel's approach does not. 
UTILITY-REFLECTING PRIORITIES
Regarding the neighboring realm of epistemic logic, and the related problem of revising belief sets in the face of conflicting information, such information often finds the reasoner less willing to give up some beliefs than others. In an attempt to allocate this ordering of ''epistemic importance'' a roˆle in determining which of the contradictory beliefs should be given up, Ga¨rdenfors (1984) proposed the following: Let K be a belief set (set of descriptive sentences) that is the logical closure of some finite basis, and £ a relation (of epistemic importance) that is a complete preorder on this set, which additionally ranks logically equivalent beliefs equally. For any remainder C 2 K ? A there is then a ''spanning sentence'' S C in C that derives any element in C. Then for any C; D 2 K ? A:
So a remainder is preferred to some other iff its spanning sentence is epistemically at least as important as that of the other. It is essential for the construction that < is a complete ordering on K, which due to logical closure includes the spanning sentence that is the ''sum'' of a remainder. But, the logical philosophers not being kings, a set of imperative-contents is rarely logically closed, which precludes a direct parallel. Yet, choosing subsets that ''in sum'' are the most important has an analogue if the ordering of the imperatives reflects not so much their importance or rank of the source, but a measure of ''goodness'' or utility of the outcome when satisfying the imperative. For this, let the (well-founded, strict partial) order < u correspond to a function u : X ! R, with I f X L PL , that assigns a real number to (at least) what the imperatives demand in a manner conversely respecting < u , i.e. if i < u j then
So an A-consistent subset is preferred to another if the good brought about by satisfying all of its demands sums up to a higher value than by doing so for the other set. I u A includes the maximally preferred among such sets. Obviously I u A IfA if u assigns just positive values. The O-operator is then defined by ðtd-7Þ hI; f; < u i OðA=CÞ iff 8C 2 I u :
If a set of imperatives that requires A to be true in the situation C constitutes a ''reason'' to call A obligatory in this situation, then O(A/C) is true if the reasons for obligatoriness A have more collective weight (sum up to a higher value) than any such reasons for :A.
14 Well-foundedness of <, with the condition that u respects <, excludes infinitely increasing utilities and thus corresponds to the limit assumption in preference semantics, which avoids counterintuitive results but may be criticized as superficial (cf. Fehige 1994) . Still, infinitely lower and lower ranking imperatives, whose satisfaction nevertheless produces some good, are not excluded, and thus not the scenario of McNamara (1995) where a bad act like killing your mum will eventually become permitted by (only then) piling up good deeds of small value. To protect imperatives from getting overruled by inferiors in this manner, one could assign to an imperative's satisfaction a utility that is absolutely higher than the sum of the utilities assigned to the satisfaction of any number of lower-ranking imperatives (think of the sequence 1, 0.5, 0.25, 0.125, ...). It is immediate that if < u is thus protected, i.e. for all i 2 I, u(i
, and u assigns just positive values, then I u A I + A.
SAFE CONTRACTION AND A MODIFICATION
What characterizes Brewka and Nebel's approaches is that they try to maximize the number of higher-ranking imperatives in a set that avoids a conflict. This intuition has a counterpart formulated by Alchourro´n (1986): 15 ''It is logical to believe that the reasonable way of overcoming a conflict of obligations is to leave aside the less important norms contributing to its creation.'' Alchourro´n's proposal is then to remove from the set of norms all those that are least-ranking in a minimal conflicting subset, thus removing the conflict as well. For the formal description of this ''safe contraction'', let IgA be the minimal sets of imperatives such that the corresponding sentences derive A (the ''A-kernels'' of I), i.e. the set of all C I such that (i) C f ' PL A and
< being a strict partial ordering on I, the following defines the set of all the least important imperatives of A-kernels of I:
Due to PL-compactness, any C 2 I gA is finite and so max < C 6 ¼ if C 6 ¼ . Then the set I/A of elements of I that are ''safe'' with respect to A is defined by
If C characterizes the situation, the dyadic deontic operator can then be defined as in (td-3), but using I=:C instead of I: 
EXAMPLE (The road accident V: safe contraction). I={!A, !B, !C}.
Mirjam left too late for both the post office and the day care center, so ' PL T ! ðC ! :BÞ. Waiting makes her too late for the day care center, so ' PL T ! ðA ! :CÞ. The legal requirement to stay and her duty to fetch her grandma are both more important than posting the letters, and Mirjam decides that the law also overrides her familiar duty, so !A<!C<!B. Intuitively Mirjam must wait and then hurry to the post office. But ¼f!A; !Cg; f!B; !Cgg; max < f!A:!Cg ¼ f!Cg; max < f!B; !Cg ¼ f!Bg: So and = {!A}. Hence a solution by safe contraction only requires Mirjam to wait for the police, though she could still post the letters when the police are finished.
The last example illustrates that safe contraction removes elements too liberally; even when it has already removed some element of a kernel, further elements get removed as well even though under the definition of a kernel removing one suffices: !C was removed due to its conflict with !A, so there was no need to also remove !B to avoid the conflict with !C. This makes life too easy for the norm subjects, and some moderation appears necessary. Following the idea that the removal mechanism should somehow be adjusted to the set's shrinking it brings about, a moderated version of safe contraction can be defined as follows: DEFINITION 6 (Moderated safe contraction). Let hI; f; <i be a prioritized imperative structure, where < is a well-founded strict partial order on I. For each A 2 L PL , let M ½<;a I; 0 a card(I), be
½<;a and . So if X are the <-minimal elements in rðIgAÞ, then the moderated mechanism first puts X in the set M < of elements to be removed, then the <-minimal elements in rð½In X gAÞ, etc. Thus elements get removed in each step until there is no A-kernel left in I minus the last version of M < , which also means that the cardinality of I suffices for the indices (I omit superscripts if the meaning is clear). To see how this works, consider again the above example: EXAMPLE (The road accident V: moderated safe contraction).
!C is the minimal element in
Removing !C is unavoidable: the only other element !A in the -kernel in which !C is maximal ranks before !C, so if !A was maximal in some -kernel, !C would not be in So !C is in M ½<;1 ¼ f!Cg, equalling M < since no -kernel is left in Inf!Cg. Hence , so both obligations -to wait and post the letters -remain.
If < is not a well-order, the moderated method still removes too much: if it removes anything from a kernel, it removes all <-maximal members, but by definition of a kernel, one is enough. Instead, one might again consider the full prioritizations that preserve <, rather than <. The relation between moderated safe contraction and Brewka's method is then the following: THEOREM 6 (Moderated safe contractions and preferred remainders). Let hI; f; <i be a prioritized imperative structure, where < is a well-founded strict partial order on I. Then is some full prioritization of <}.
Uniquely prioritized imperatives
As demonstrated, the method proposed by Brewka and Nebel seems adequate for a resolution of normative conflicts by use of priority orderings of the DEONTIC LOGICS FOR PRIORITIZED IMPERATIVES underlying norms. Whether all conflicts and dilemmas are thus avoidable is a matter of dispute. W. D. Ross may be understood as claiming that conflicts are merely apparent and that by weighing all relevant facts and reasons, it can be decided which of the conflicting prima facie duties are really our duties (cf. Ross 1930 , Searle 1980 . G. H. von Wright stated that an axiological order can ''provide a safeguard against any genuine predicament' ' (cf. von Wright 1968, p. 68, 80) . And Hare's description of ''critical moral thinking,'' that lets principles override other, less important principles, suggests that this process can overcome all moral conflicts (Hare 1981, p. 43, 50) . On the other hand, Barcan Marcus (1980) and Horty (2003, p. 564) have argued that if it is the presence of certain facts that determines the ordering, i.e. this is not an arbitrary hacking through the Gordian knot, then situations might be incomparable (if all such facts are missing), or be completely symmetrical (e.g. identical obligations towards identical twins), so conflicts remain possible.
Rather than take sides in this controversy, I will examine what is required if the method of Brewka and Nebel is to resolve all conflicts and dilemmas. For all possible 17 situations C; I + :C must then be a singleton: otherwise there are C; D 2 I + :C such that C f [ D f ' PL :C, and there is a dilemma. So I define:
DEFINITION 7 (Uniquely prioritized imperatives). Let hI; f; <i be a prioritized imperative structure, Then hI; f; <i is called uniquely prioritized iff for all C 2 L PL such that, 0 PL :C, cardðI + :CÞ ¼ 1.
The question of a resolution of all conflicts can now be rephrased to ask what an imperative structure hI; f; <i must be like to be uniquely prioritized. The most obvious way to avoid all conflicts for any situation C is to let the strict partial order < be total, i.e. for any two i, j 2 I, either i < j or j < i. Then there is just one full prioritization 0 that preserves <, namely < itself. This result was also noted by Nebel (1992, Proposition 11) , who constructs < as the strict part of a complete preorder £ ) then requiring < to be total makes each equivalence class [i] a singleton. Ga¨rdenfors (1984, p. 146) , who also constructs < as the strict part of some complete preorder £, points out that it is enough if the only choice left is between equivalents, i.e. here either i < j or j < i for any i, j 2 I with 0 PL i f $ j f . But this still requires too much. It suffices that the demands of elements in each [i] are chained, so for all j 1 ; j 2 2 ½i :
1 -then it does not matter in which order j 1 and j 2 appear in a full prioritization 0 of <.
18 And one can be even more lax, as demonstrated by the following cases, which also are of a sort in which no ambiguity ever arises:
Case 1: Let hI; f; <i be ½!p 1 ; !p 2 <!ðp 1^p2 Þ, so the demands of the two higher-ranking imperatives are ''doubled'' by a lower one. If both, !p 1 , !p 2 are in S 0 2 I + :C, then adding !ðp 1^p2 Þ adds nothing. Otherwise
Case 2: Let hI; f; <i be ½!p 1 ; !p 2 <!:ðp 1^p2 Þ, so the demands of the two higher-ranking imperatives run contrary to the lower one's. Either both !p 1 ,!p 2 are in S 0 2 I + :C, so !:ðp 1^p2 Þ cannot be consistently added, or ½S ½0#!:ðp 1^p2 Þ f [ fCg ' PL :ðp 1^p2 Þ, so adding !:ðp 1^p2 Þ adds nothing.
Case 3: Let hI; f; <i be !ðp 1^p2 Þ<!ðp 1^: p 2 Þ<½!p 1 ; !p 2 . If p 1^p2 is consistent with C, then I + :C is ff!ðp 1^p2 Þ; !p 1 ; !p 2 gg. Otherwise, fCg ' PL :ðp 1^p2 Þ. If p 1^: p 2 is consistent with C, then I + :C is ff!ðp 1^: p 2 Þ; !p 1 gg. Otherwise, also fCg ' PL ; :ðp 1^: p 2 Þ. Hence fCg ' PL :p 1 . Then any set in I + :C contains at most !p 2 , depending on whether C is consistent with p 2 .
Unable to make out a necessary and sufficient requirement for cardðI + :CÞ ¼ 1, without reference to particular C, I can only rephrase its definition as follows:
THEOREM 7 (Property of uniquely prioritized imperatives).
Any hI; f; <i, where < is the strict part of some complete preorder £, is uniquely prioritized iff for all consistent C 2 L PL ; C 2 I + :C; i 2 I and j 1 , j 2 2 [i],
Let a semantics be called a uniquely prioritized imperative semantics iff it defines the truth of L DDL -sentences using (td-6), but only considers uniquely prioritized imperative structures. It validates the additional axiom scheme:
ðRMonÞ PðD=CÞ ! ðOðA=CÞ ! OðA=C^DÞÞ:
Consider the system PD that was sound and (weakly) complete with respect to prioritized imperative semantics. The system that results when (RMon) is added is Hansson's (1969) DSDL3 as axiomatized by Spohn (1975): THEOREM 8 (PD+RMon equals DSDL3). Let PD+(RMon) be like PD, except that (RMon) is added as art axiom scheme. Then PD+(RMon) = DSDL3, which is the smallest set that contains all L DDLinstances into tautologies as well as all L PL -instances of the following schemes: 
DEONTIC LOGICS FOR PRIORITIZED IMPERATIVES
Hansson's DSDL3, which is also the core of Å qivist's (1986) system G, usually characterizes a preference-based dyadic deontic semantics, i.e. an interpretation of deontic formulas using a ''betterness relation'' between valuations or possible worlds, and not using explicitly given norms as it is here. However, this extreme interpretational change did not result in a changed logical behavior of the deontic operators, i.e. DSDL3 can be reconstructed quite naturally using an imperative semantics with an axiological order in the spirit of von Wright (1968):
THEOREM 9 (Soundness, completeness of DSDL3). DSDL3 is sound and (only) weakly complete for uniquely prioritized imperative semantics.
The construction used to prove the completeness theorem also exhibits the following relation between priorities and contrary-to-duty norms: suppose there is a finite, or finitely based, set of deontic truths D L DDL , and hI; f; <i is a uniquely prioritized imperative structure that makes true all of D. The construction used to prove DSDL3-completeness provides a uniquely prioritized imperative structure hI 0 ; f 0 ; < 0 i that also makes true all of D, but the demands of these imperatives are now chained and so the priority relation can remain empty or let all imperatives rank equally (cf. Theorem 7). E.g. if hI; f; <i is !p 1 < !p 2 , then hI 0 ; f 0 ; < 0 i is ½!ðp 1^p2 Þ; !ð:ðp 1^p2 Þ ! p 1 Þ; !ðð:ðp 1^p2 Þ^:p 1 Þ ! p 2 Þ. These can be viewed as contrary-to-duty norms, where the primary obligation is: to make p 1^p2 true, if that is not possible, to make p 1 true, and if that is also not possible, to make p 2 true. So instead of using ranks and priorities to avoid conflicts, contrary-to-duty formalizations can be employed to produce the same effect. While there may be pragmatic reasons to attach higher priority to the commands of the king than the wishes of his jester, from the standpoint of logic, exception clauses like ''if the king did not say otherwise'' suffice.
Conclusion
Describing how a resolution of normative conflicts using priorities works is surprisingly difficult. A method based on a proposal by Horty could not solve complex cases where more than two norms conflict or overriding norms are no longer satisfiable or are themselves overridden. A method developed for theory revision by Brewka and Nebel, which creates maximally non-conflicting sets by starting with a maximal set of what is most important and incrementally adding maximally to it, is able to resolve these difficulties. Alternative mechanisms discussed in normative theory, namely Alchourro´n and Makinson's exposure criterion and variants by Prakken and Sartor, have counterintuitive results in cases that Brewka and Nebel's method adequately solves. The same holds for Alchourro´n's ''safe contractions'', but the intuition underlying his construction, that in a conflict the least important norms should be set aside, is captured in a moderated version that is equivalent to Brewka's. I explain how a semantics that models explicitly given imperatives can be used to define deontic operators. When the ''preferred remainders'' from Brewka and Nebel's method are thus used for the definition of a disjunctive (skeptical) dyadic deontic operator, then such a semantics is characterized by the axiom system PD, which resembles Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor's system P with the dyadic D-axiom added. Whether all conflicts can be resolved using priorities is left to philosophical dispute, but conditions are discussed that guarantee priority orderings, which do just that. For a semantics that defines its dyadic deontic operators with respect to such ''uniquely prioritized'' imperatives, Hansson's axiom system DSDL3 is proved to be sound and complete. The proof's construction also exhibits the fact that priorities are dispensable and that contrary-to-duty constructions can take their place.
Most of the approaches discussed here include conditional entities, which pose different problems like the following (rephrased from Rintanen 1994):
(1) a says: if you drink anything, then don't drive. Suppose that b does not mind if you have one drink with c, and c does not care that you may be driving, and let the three imperatives be ranked in descending order. One may be tempted to reason as follows: consider first the imperative in line (1), but it has not yet been 'triggered' as you have not yet drunk anything, so it is set aside. Regarding (2), its condition is true, so you must do the driving. Still, only (3) is triggered, so you should have a drink with c. But satisfying (2) and (3) both triggers and violates the highest-ranking imperative. Is it not more prudent to violate one of the lower-ranking imperatives instead of the higher-ranking one? For a solution, we need an adequate definition of triggering (that can handle e.g. disjunctive inputs, like Makinson and van der Torre's ''basic output'' van der Torre 2000, 2001) , and to find a maximizing strategy that is consistent with the above intuition. It is clear that the present discussion has not provided the tools to properly address such problems, so these must be left to further study. 
Notes
1 Though some discussed approaches cover conditional imperatives, or entities that can be interpreted as such, these cause problems that are best considered separately. 2 PL is based on a language L PL , defined from a set of proposition letters Prop ={p 1 ,
The truth of a L PL -sentence A is defined recursively using a valuation function v : Prop ! f1; 0g (I write v A), starting with v p iff v(p)=1 and continuing as usual. If A 2 L PL is true for all valuations it is called a tautology. PL is the set of all tautologies, and this set is used to define provability, consistency and derivability (I write C ' PL A) as usual. > is an arbitrary tautology, and ? is :>. 3 E.g. (td-1) most closely resembles definitions of Kanger (1957) and Alchourro´n and Bulygin (1981) . For authors belonging to this tradition cf. Hansen (2001) , Section 1 and Hansen (2004), fn. 1, in addition to which Ziemba (1971) must be mentioned. 4 Cf. Horty (1997) . The ''disjunctive'' ought is more commonly referred to as ''skeptical'' non-monotonic inference. Horty (2003) attributes the proposal to Brink (1994) , yet the idea to use such a definition for (dyadic) deontic logic already appears in Lewis (1981) . For alternatives in the deontic-logical treatment of normative conflicts cf. Goble (2005) . 5 Cf. Kraus et al. (1990) , where, however, the proofs are done in a more general setting. Also cf. my (Hansen 2005) for constructive proofs in the manner of Spohn (1975) as well as more comparisons and truth definitions and axioms for an alternative ''credulous'' O-operator. 6 Horty's definition only employs circumstances to derive consequents from a set of conditional imperatives, but this has no effect on the solution of the examples. 7 Horty is preparing a refined version of Binding that solves all of the examples (private correspondence). 8 Brewka (1991) and for Nebel cf. Rott (1993, fn. 9) . For the rationale, let the ordered I be hi 0 ; . . . ; i 0:125 ; i 0:25 ; i 0:5 ; i 1 i, with i 1 ¼ !p; i 0:5 ¼ !:p; i 0:25 ¼ !p; i 0:125 ¼ !:p, etc., and i 0 =!q. We cannot tell whether p or :p is obligatory, but this is not a case of conflict either, all imperatives !p being overridden by ones demanding :p, and vice versa. 9 I use notation from both, Brewka ( , 1991 , Brewka and Eiter (1999 ), and Nebel (1991 . 10 Also cf. Sartor (2005, p. 734) : ''preference must be given to the argument such that its weakest defeasible subreasons are better than the weakest defeasible subreasons in the other''. 11 Prakken could argue that he only compares minimal conflict pairs (subarguments), which f!p 1 ; !p 2 g; f!ðp 3^: p 1 Þ; !ðp 4^: p 2 Þg is not, while f!p 1 g ( P f!ðp 3^: p 1 Þg and f!p 2 g ( P f!ðp 4^: p 2 Þg hold. But let I ¼ f!p 1 ; !p 2 ; !ðp 3^ð p 4 ! :ðp 1^p2 ÞÞÞ; !ðp 4^ð p 3 ! : ðp 1^p2 ÞÞÞg, with !p 1 < !ðp 3^ð p 4 ! :ðp 1^p2 ÞÞÞ and !p 2 < !ðp 4^ð p 3 ! :ðp 1^p2 ÞÞÞ, so with the primary targets one ''bonus'' secondary target is reachable. Still f!p 1 ; !p 2 g 6 ( P f!ðp 3^ð p 4 ! :ðp 1^p2 ÞÞÞ; !ðp 4^ð p 3 ! :ðp 1^p2 ÞÞÞg, and this is a minimal conflict pair. Yet intuitively, the argument for p 1 Ù p 2 should win over any for :ðp 1^p2 Þ.
12 Sartor (1991) simply rejects contradictions, yet the adjustment to any A is immediate. 13 The indicative version of the example also shows that Prakken cannot avoid counterintuitive results by replacing, in his definition of a rebuttal in (1997), his own relation ( P by the relation ( AM of Alchouro´n and Makinson for the comparison of minimal conflict pairs: then all arguments for q are rebutted by arguments for :q as demonstrated, but intuitively any consistent argument including i 1 cannot be defeated and so the argument for q should win. 14 For resolving legal arguments by summing up weights of reasons cf. Hage ( , 1996 . 15 Also cf. Iwin (1972, p. 486) : ''When we are in a situation compelled to satisfy two obligations requiring contradictory actions, then the most natural way out of this difficulty consists in comparing the two obligations and not satisfying the less important one.'' 16 I=:C is the notation in Alchourro´n and Makinson (1985) , whereas the notation in Alchourro´n (1986) would be I/C. Alchourro´n's own truth definition for deontic operators employs a deontic logic as basic logic and conditional imperatives that are not treated here. 17 If C is a contradiction, then by definition I + :C ¼ [. 18 I owe this insight to Leon van der Torre (private correspondence).
Proof For the induction step, let i be some arbitrary element of I. By definition of 0, the elements of C \ ½i are positioned 0-before any other elements of D \ ½i. The induction hypothesis guarantees that for all j 2 I with j<i : THEOREM 4 (Preferred remainders, after Ryan and Sakama & Inoue) . Let hI; f; <i be a prioritized imperative structure, < a well-founded strict partial order on I and I + A and pðIfAÞ be as defined. Then I + A ¼ pðIfAÞ.
Proof. Left-to-right: Suppose S 0 2 I + A. Assume for r.a.a. that there is a C 6 ¼ S 0 in IfA such that for all i 2 S 0 nC there is a j 2 CnS 0 with j 0 i. Let i be the 0-least element in S 0 nC, which is not empty, because otherwise S 0 C, but this is excluded by maximality of S 0 , so existence of i is guaranteed by well-foundedness of 0. Then S k0i S ½<#k C: otherwise there is some k 2 S 0 with k 0 i but k 6 2 C and so i would not be the 0-least. Since j 6 2 S 0 it must be that ½S ½<#j f [ fj f g ' PL A. But j 0 i, so S ½<#j S k0i S ½<#k , and chaining results we get C f ' PL A, which contradicts C 2 IfA. Right-to-left: Suppose C 2 pðIfAÞ. Let 0 be a full prioritization for which the statement in the definition of pðIfAÞ is true. By definition, S 0 is in I + A and so also in IfA. Assume for r.a.a. that S 0 6 ¼ C. Then there is some i 2 CnS 0 such that for all j 2 S 0 nC; i 0 j. Suppose S j0i S ½0#j 6 fj 2 C j j 0 ig. Then there is a j 2 S 0 n C : j 0 i and so i 6 0 j by the antisymmetry of 0, and ihj since 0 preserves <, but we assumed otherwise. So S j0i S ½0#j fj 2 C j j 0 ig. Since i 2 CnS 0 it must be that i 6 2 S 0 , so by definition
THEOREM 5 (Soundness, completeness of PD). PD is sound and (only) weakly complete with respect to prioritized imperative semantics.
Proof. (Sketch) We must prove that PD is (a) sound with respect to prioritized imperative semantics, (b) (weakly) complete with respect to prioritized imperative semantics and (c) only weakly complete, i.e. not compact. (b) Weak completeness. We must prove that for any A 2 L DDL such that :A 6 2 PD there is a prioritized imperative structure hI; f; <i that models A. I proved PD to be weakly complete for basic imperative semantics and (td-4) in Hansen (2005) , so take the basic imperative structure hI; f i that models A and define <¼ [. Then I + :C ¼ If:C for any C. Hence hI; f; <i also models A using (td-6).
(c) Non-compactness. Leaving details to the reader, I gave a counterexample to compactness of basic imperative semantics in Hansen (2005, Theorem 3), i.e. a non-satisfiable set C L DDL of which all finite subsets are satisfiable, which applies here as well. The tricky part is to show that the sets I p 1 [ I ðp 1 $:p 2 Þ and I :p 1 [ I ðp 1 $p 2 Þ are in I +?, which works using the complete preorder induced by ordinal labels from the proof of Theorem 1 (for each union choose a full prioritization 0 that puts its elements 0-first in any equivalence class and prove that S 0 in I +? constructed from 0 equals the respective union).
THEOREM 6 (Moderated safe contractions and preferred remainders). Let hI; f; <i be a prioritized imperative structure, where < is a well-founded strict partial order on I. Then is some full prioritization of <}. Proof. For next(i), note that due to well-orderliness, the 0-minimum of a non-empty set is a singleton, and so is next(i), unless there is no j in M 0 with i=j or i 0 j, in which case it is [. For M i , note that since M ½0;a increases with each step a, 0 £ a < card(I), the inclusion-minimum is well defined. To prove the lemma, if neither i 2 M 0 nor a 0-next member in M 0 exists and so M i ¼ M 0 , then the equivalence is trivial. Otherwise M i ¼ M ½0;a for some a, and we must prove that (i) if j 2 I is in M ½0;a n nextðiÞ then j 0 i, and (ii) that if j 2 M 0 is not in M ½0;a n nextðiÞ then j = 0 i. ad i): Let j 2 M ½0;a . We assumed next(i) to be non-empty, so let next(i)={i 0 }. By definition, i 0 is the element of M ½0;a that was added at step a and so if i 0 =j, then j is not in M ½0;a A n nextðiÞ. Otherwise, by the construction of M ½0;a ; j is in some M ½0;b with b < a. Let b be the smallest of these. To be in the increase of M ½0;a ; i 0 must be 0-maximal in some A-kernel X in I n S c<a M ½0;c . Since the process is incremental, we have I n S c<a M ½0;c I n S c<b M ½0;c . So X I n S c<b M ½0;c . Hence, if i 0 0 j, then j is not 0-minimal among the 0-maximal members of A-kernels in I n S c<b M ½0;c , but this contradicts that j is the element by which M ½0;b was increased at step b. So i 0 = 0 j, we supposed i 0 " j, and so by 0-connectedness j 0 i 0 . Also, if i=j or i 0 j, then i 0 =j or i 0 0 j by the definition of next(i) and j 2 M 0 . By the previous result and 0-transitivity, we obtain j 0 j, contradicting 0-irreflexivity. So i = 0 j; i 6 ¼ j and hence by connectedness, j 0 i.
ad ii): Assume j 2 M 0 is not in M ½0;a n nextðiÞ. Again let next(i)={i 0 }. So i 0 is the element of M ½0;a , which is added at step a. If j=i¢, then i=j or i 0 j and in both cases j = 0 i. Otherwise j must be in some M ½0;b with a<b. Let b be the smallest of these. To be in the increase of M ½0;b ; j must be 0-maximal in some A-kernel X in I n S c<b M ½0;c . Since the process is incremental, we have I n S c<b M ½0;c I n S c<a M ½0;c . So X I n S c<a M ½0;c . Suppose j 0 i 0 , then i 0 is not 0-minimal among the 0-maximal members of A-kernels in I n S c<a M ½0;c . But this contradicts that i 0 is the element by which M ½0;a was increased at step a. So j = 0 i 0 , and we supposed j " i 0 . Thus by 0-connectedness, i 0 0 j and hence i 0 j by 0-transitivity and definition of next(i). For the theorem, it now suffices to prove that for each full prioritization 0; A 2 L PL and accordingly constructed sets S 0 (Definition 2) and M 0 (Definition 8), I n M 0 ¼ S 0 ; which is done by induction over 0:
Induction basis: Let i 0 be the 0-least element in I. Suppose i 0 is in I n M 0 : I n M 0 contains no A-kernels, so fi 0 g0 PL A and so i 0 is in S 0 . Suppose i 0 is not in I n M 0 . Then i 0 is 0-maximal in some A-kernel of I. So for all other j in this A-kernel, j 0 i, but also i 0 j because i 0 is 0-least. So by 0-antisymmetry this A-kernel equals {i 0 }, so fi f 0 g ' PL A and by definition i 0 6 2 S 0 . Hence i 0 2 I n M 0 iff i 0 2 S 0 .
Induction step: Right-to-left: Suppose i 6 2 I n M 0 , so i 2 M 0 . Let a be the step that has i in its increase, i.e. Hence ½I n S b<a M ½0;b \ fj 2 I j j 0 ig ¼ ½I n ½M 0 \ fj 2 I j j 0 ig \ fj 2 I j j 0 ig ¼ ½I n M 0 \ fj 2 I j j 0 ig which by the induction hypothesis equals S 0 \ fj 2 I j j 0 ig, and by definition this equals S j0i S ½0#j . To be in the increase of M ½0;a ; i must be 0-maximal in some A-kernel X in I n S b<a M ½0;b , so X ½I n S b<a M ½0;b \ fj 2 I j j 0 ig [ fig. So by definition of an A-kernel and the above equation, ½ S j0i S ½0#j f [ fi f g ' PL A. Hence i 6 2 S ½0#i and i 6 2 S 0 . Left-to-right: Suppose i 6 2 S 0 . So by definition ½ S j0i S ½0#j f [ fi f g ' PL A and ½ S j0i S ½0#j f 0 PL A. By the induction hypothesis S j0i S ½0#j ¼ S 0 \ fj 2 I j j 0 ig ¼ ½I n M 0 \ fj 2 I j j 0 ig. By the above lemma, M 0 \ fj 2 I j j 0 ig ¼ M i n nextðiÞ and so ½I n M 0 \ fj 2 I j j 0 ig ¼ ½I n ½M 0 \ fj 2 I j j 0 ig \ fj 2 I j j 0 ig ¼ ½I n ½M i n nextðiÞ \ fj 2 I j j 0 ig, which, since nextðiÞ I, equals ½½I n M i [ nextðiÞ \ fj 2 I j j 0 ig, which equalssuch that S 0 1 6 ¼ S 0 2 for the according S 0 1 ; S 0 2 2 I + :C. Then there is a i 2 Iprioritized imperative structure hI; f; <i that models A. We build a disjunctive normal form of A and obtain a disjunction of conjunctions, where each conjunct is O(B/D) or :OðB=DÞ. One disjunct must then be DSDL3-consistent. Let d be that disjunct. Let the d-restricted language L Observe that for all C i , C j , 1 £ i < j £ n:
Proof. Immediate (due to A0 and O1, ' PL O C j ! C j so also O C j^O C i ¼?). . .^p n Þ, n > 1, is the empty set and that plus :ðp 1^. . .^p n Þ is consistent with :p 1 and A^:p n if fAg0 PL p n . So Pð:p 1 =:ðp 1^. . .^p n ÞÞ and PðA^:p n =: ðp 1^. . .^p n ÞÞ are true for any n > 1. Hence D is finitely satisfiable.
Suppose D is satisfiable, i.e. there is a uniquely prioritized imperative structure hI; f; <i that makes all D true. The sets I +? and I + ðp 1^. . .^p n Þ must be singletons (Definition 9). To make Oðp 1 =>Þ true, there must be some full prioritization 0 such that ½S
